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REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL COURTS IN 
SEARCH OF RELEVANCE: 
ADJUDICATING POLITICALLY SENSITIVE 




The Central American and the Caribbean Courts of Justice (CACJ and 
CCJ) are hybrid judicial institutions. While their Member States envisioned 
them as “EU-style” regional economic courts, they have explored the whole 
extension of their formally delegated functions and have developed peculiar 
expertise in matters relating to freedom of movement, human and 
fundamental rights, and other politically fraught issues. The article explains 
how two International Courts (ICs) seemingly established to build common 
markets have come to adjudicate high-stakes political disputes, which, 
ostensibly, have little to do with regional economic integration. The article 
posits that the scholarship on delegation to ICs is only partially able to 
provide an answer to this question. It, hence, suggests an alternative 
theoretical framework by relying on transnational field theory and reflexive 
sociology. The article demonstrates that, despite the rhetoric of their 
founding documents, both the CACJ and the CCJ were only partially 
established to pursue regional economic integration. Instead, both Courts 
were fashioned at the crossroads of several—and at times even conflicting—
forms of legality, power battles, professional interests, and visions of the 
world that shaped the Central American and Caribbean legal fields over 
time. Seen through the diachronic lens of the interests, ideologies, 
professional practices, and visions of the world of the actors inhabiting the 
Central American and Caribbean legal fields, the involvement of the two 
Courts in politically sensitive issues becomes less surprising, and—the 
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article argues—it constitutes part of a strategy of the judges to legitimize the 
two Courts vis-à-vis their peculiar institutional, political, and social 
environments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Central American Court of Justice (CACJ) and the Caribbean Court 
of Justice (CCJ) are the judicial organs of the Central American System of 
Regional Integration (SICA) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
respectively. The main function of these two Courts is to foster economic 
and legal integration in Central America and the Caribbean. The CACJ 
interprets and executes the Protocol of Tegucigalpa (the Protocol) and its 
complementary instruments.1 The CCJ has compulsory and exclusive 
jurisdiction to solve the disputes concerning the interpretation and 
application of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (the RTC).2 
Despite this, both the CACJ and the CCJ serve only partially as “EU-
style” regional economic courts,3 while they have explored the whole 
extension of their formally delegated functions,4 developing peculiar 
expertise in matters relating to freedom of movement, human and 
fundamental rights, and mega-politics.5 Among the Courts’ most important 
cases,6 one may found judgments against Barbados for disrespecting the 
CARICOM immigration policies7 and for violating death penalty standards 
set up by international human rights treaties,8 against Belize for violating 
 
 1.  Statute of the Central American Court of Justice art. 2, Dec. 11, 1992, available at 
http://portal.ccj.org.ni/ccjdemo/normativa/. 
 2.  Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas art. 211, 2011, available at http://caricom.org/about-
caricom/who-we-are/our-governance/the-revised-treaty/. 
 3.  Both Courts have produced several rulings on trade disputes. See Salvatore Caserta, Regional 
Integration through Law–the Interplay Between De Jure and De Facto Supranationality in Central 
America and the Caribbean, 30 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 579, 579, 586 (2017). 
 4.  In addition to its Community Law competencies entrenched in the Court’s Original Jurisdiction 
(OJ), the CCJ has also an Appellate Jurisdiction (AJ), which aims at replacing the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council (JCPC) as the court of last resort of those Caribbean States that were once British 
colonies. In the AJ, the CCJ rules over criminal and civil matters and it is competent to interpret the 
constitutions of those states that have ratified such a jurisdiction. See Derek O’Brien & Sonia Foadi, 
CARICOM and its Court of Justice, 37 COMM. LAW WORLD REV. 334, 334 (2008). Similarly, besides 
being an EU-style Community Court, the CACJ is empowered to rule over inter-state conflicts, separation 
of powers disputes between the constitutional organs of the SICA Member States and as an arbitral 
tribunal. KATIN N. METCALF & IOANNIS PAPAGEORGIOU, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND COURTS OF 
JUSTICE 55 (2005). 
 5.  Throughout the paper, mega-politics is understood as: “matters of outright and utmost political 
significance that often define and divide the whole polities.” Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-
Politics and the Rise of Political Courts, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 93, 93 (2008).  
 6.  The judgments of both the CACJ and the CCJ are available on the two Courts’ websites. 
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/judgments-proceedings and http://portal.ccj.org.ni/ccj/ 
expedientes.  
 7.  Shanique Myrie v. Barbados, OA 002, ¶ 101 (CCJ, 2012). 
 8.  See generally Attorney General of Barbados v. Joseph and Boyce, CV 2 (CCJ, 2006). 
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indigenous property rights,9 and, finally, against the Parliament of Nicaragua 
for pursuing a soft coup d’état against then-President Enrique Bolaños.10 
Although not unique in the landscape of International Courts (ICs) 
outside Europe,11 the involvement of the CACJ and of the CCJ into 
politically sensitive cases is theoretically puzzling. Like other regional 
organizations, the CARICOM and the SICA have only partially progressed 
towards their established goals of regional economic integration and the 
barriers to intra-regional trade have not been systematically challenged 
before the two Courts yet. Moreover, adjudicating high-stakes political 
disputes is not entirely in sync with what the Governments of the SICA and 
CARICOM States expect from the two Courts. These rulings also clash with 
the reluctance of Central American and Caribbean national courts to deal 
with such topics in their legal systems. Finally, the involvement of recently 
established ICs into politically fraught disputes challenges several existing 
theories that posit that these institutions shall adopt particular legal and 
extralegal strategies when ruling in highly sensitive disputes in order to avoid 
political pushbacks.12 
The primary goal of this article is to explain how two ICs seemingly 
established to build common markets and to enforce trade liberalization have 
come to rule on high-stakes political disputes, which, ostensibly, have little 
to do with regional economic integration and are not entirely in line with the 
preference of the two Courts’ Member States. In so doing, the article shows 
that the scholarship on delegation to ICs is only partially able to account for 
the Central American and Caribbean experiences. The article, hence, 
suggests an alternative explanation by relying on the theoretical tools 
provided by transnational field theory and reflexive sociology.13 Through 
this theoretical framework, the article demonstrates that, despite the rhetoric 
 
 9.  See Maya Leaders Alliance et al. v. Attorney General of Belize, 366, ¶ 126–27 (CCJ, 2015). 
 10.  See generally Ingeniero Enrique Bolaños Geyer v. Asamblea Nacional de la República de 
Nicaragua, CACJ n. 69-01-03-01-2005 (CACJ, 2005). 
 11.  Both the Economic Community of West Africa Court of Justice (ECOWAS Court) and the East 
African Court of Justice (EACJ) have recently expanded their jurisdiction to encompass human rights. 
See Karen J. Alter, et al., A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS 
Community Court of Justice, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 737, 737 (2013). James T. Gathii, Mission Creep or a 
Search for Relevance: The East African Court of Justice’s Human Rights Strategy, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 249, 250 (2013). 
 12.  Karen J. Alter, Agents or Trustees? International Courts in their Political Context, 14 EUR. J. 
INT’L REL. 33, 33 (2008). Mikael R. Madsen, The Protracted Institutionalization of the Strasbourg Court: 
From Legal Diplomacy to Integrationist Jurisprudence, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS (2011). 
 13.  Mikael R. Madsen & Yves Dezalay, The Force of Law and Lawyers: Pierre Bourdieu and the 
Reflexive Sociology of Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 433, 433 (2012). Mikael R. Madsen, Sociological 
Approaches to International Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 
400 (2014).  
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of their founding documents, both the CACJ and the CCJ were only partially 
established to pursue regional economic integration. Instead, both Courts 
were fashioned at the crossroads of several—and at times even conflicting—
forms of legality, power relations, professional interests, and visions of the 
world that have characterized the Central American and Caribbean legal 
fields over time. 
The CACJ was established, and then controlled, by a close network of 
legal professionals—the Presidents of the Supreme Courts of the Central 
American States—whose main goal was to pacify and democratize Central 
America by legal and judicial means. The CCJ emerged out of the 
professional and ideological struggles fought by two elites of Caribbean 
lawyers in the shadow of the process of Caribbean decolonization from the 
United Kingdom. These two groups are a transnational power elite of 
English-educated Caribbean lawyers, who have played a double role in the 
struggle for Caribbean independence and in fostering the persistence of some 
of the legal aspects of British colonialism, and a younger generation of 
Caribbean-trained lawyers, willing to equip the CARICOM with the legal 
and institutional tools to throw the Caribbean into the new global economy 
at the end of the Cold War.14 
Seen through the diachronic lens of the interests, ideologies, 
professional practices, and visions of the world of the actors inhabiting the 
Central American and Caribbean legal fields, the involvement of the two 
Courts in politically sensitive issues becomes less surprising. I, therefore, 
argue that this judicial behavior constitutes part of a strategy of the judges to 
legitimize the two Courts vis-à-vis their peculiar institutional, political, and 
social contexts. In particular, the two Courts did not limit themselves to 
develop some kind of formal and neutral legal rationality à l’européenne. 
Conversely, they aimed at producing substantively thick regional legal 
systems in order to make themselves relevant in the eyes of the major 
stakeholders in their fields of operation. 
The article relies on 63 qualitative interviews with key stakeholders of 
the SICA and the CARICOM.15 The interview-based research is informed 
by the reflexive sociology of law and is aimed at understanding institutional 
and legal developments from the perspective of the agents surrounding the 
two Courts.16 For this purpose, the heuristic notion of the field proved to be 
 
 14.  See generally Salvatore Caserta & Mikael R. Madsen, Between Community Law and Common 
Law: The Rise of the Caribbean Court of Justice at the Intersection of Regional Integration and Post-
Colonial Legacies, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 89 (2016). 
 15.  The interviews were conducted during three field trips in Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, 
Guyana, Nicaragua, and El Salvador between 2013 and 2014.  See infra Appendix n. 1. 
 16.  See generally Madsen & Dezalay, supra note 13. 
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a very helpful research tool. Framing the social space surrounding the two 
Courts in terms of network of objective (adversarial) relations over the 
meaning and purpose of these two institutions allowed me to capture the 
social continuities (and discontinuities) in the construction of professional 
practices and interests as well as visions of the world around the two 
Courts.17 In this regard, the collective-relational biographies of the 
stakeholders of the Central American and Caribbean legal fields provided 
key evidence.18 By using the agents surrounding the two Courts as a vantage 
point, the article unveils the hierarchical structures in which individuals and 
groups operate, thus, objectivizing the socio-political dynamics and the very 
interests at stake concerning both the CACJ and the CCJ. 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follow. Section II examines the 
theories of the delegation to ICs and formulates several hypotheses on the 
judicial behavior of the two Courts that will be empirically tested through 
the article. Section III presents the high-stakes political rulings decided by 
the two Courts. These are chiefly concerned with freedom of movement and 
human and fundamental rights in the Caribbean and inter-state conflicts and 
other politically sensitive issues in Central America. Section IV analyzes this 
case-law in the light of the hypotheses set forth in Section II, assessing the 
virtues and the limits of the existing theories of delegation to ICs. Here, the 
article shows that each theory alone does not fully explain the Central 
American and Caribbean experiences. Consequently, Section V offers an 
alternative explanation by providing a trans-historical and contextual 
analysis of the creation and of the professional interests, ideologies, and 
practices of the main stakeholders of the Caribbean and Central American 
legal fields.  In so doing, the article shows that both Courts were only 
partially established to pursue regional economic integration, while they 
were also envisaged as tools to pacify Central America and to complete the 
process of Caribbean decolonization from the United Kingdom. This section 
concludes by arguing that the involvement of the two Courts in politically 
sensitive issues is part of an attempt of the judges of the two Courts to 
legitimize these institutions vis-à-vis their peculiar socio-political contexts. 
Section VI concludes by summarizing the main arguments of the paper. 
II. THEORIES OF DELEGATION TO ICS 
Why have the CACJ and the CCJ pushed themselves to the limits of 
their mandates, making themselves known as tribunals willing to deal with 
politically sensitive issues rather than limiting themselves to the “safer” role 
 
 17.  Id. at 439. 
 18.  See id. for an account of collective biographies. 
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of regional economic courts? Theories of delegation to ICs would answer 
this question in at least three different ways. For these theories, ICs are: 
agents of states,19 trustees,20 and actors that alter national, regional, and 
international politics.21 
A. Principal-Agent (P-A) Theory 
For P-A theorists, delegation of power to an IC: “is a conditional grant 
of authority from a principal [a state] to an agent [an IC] that empowers the 
latter to act on behalf of the former. This grant of authority is limited in time 
or scope and can be revocable by the principal.”22 In this view, ICs are 
essentially ineffectual at forcing compliance with decisions that do not 
conform to the interests of their principals. Different from national Supreme 
Courts—which are backed up by the coercive power of the state—ICs lack 
formal means for compelling states to comply with their decisions.23 
This, in turn, means that the principals maintain a high degree of control 
over the ICs they establish. Principals, in fact, decide: the appointment of the 
judges, the amount of powers delegated to them, and, in most cases, even 
their finances. As Paul Stephan puts it: “Knowing that they can be replaced, 
the members of the tribunal have an incentive not to do anything that will 
upset the countries with nominating authority.”24 
Hypothesis #1: the CACJ and the CCJ would be expected to comply 
with the interests of the delegating states, which would be estimated to 
“punish” the two Courts for not doing so. 
B. Trustee Theories 
Under Trustee Theories, ICs enjoy a certain degree of autonomy from 
the states as these delegate powers: “to harness the authority of the Trustee 
so as to enhance the legitimacy of political decision-making.”25 Four 
 
 19.  See generally MARK A. POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: DELEGATION, 
AGENCY, AND AGENDA SETTING IN THE EU (2003). 
 20.  Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 274 (1997); Alter, supra note 12, at 37.  
 21.  See generally KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, 
POLITICS, RIGHTS (2013).  
 22.  Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations and 
Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1, 7 (Darren 
G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006). 
 23.  See generally Geoffrey Garrett & Barry Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: 
Constructing the EC’s Internal Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY 173 (Judith Goldstein & Robert 
O. Keohane eds., 1993). 
 24.  Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals and Legal Unification — The Agency Problem, 3 CHI. J. 
INT.L L. 333, 337 (2002).  
 25.  According to Alter, trustees are: “1) selected because of their personal reputation; 2) given 
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conditions must be met for an IC to avoid state control: i) non-compliance 
disputes with the treaties must be regularly filed before the IC; ii) the IC must 
produce defensible rulings; iii) states shall give precedence to the reasons 
given by the IC in its legal reasoning; and iv) the IC’s rulings must trigger 
the interest of “compliance constituencies.”26 However, as posited by Karen 
J. Alter: “should a Trustee stray beyond what the power elite or body politic 
can accept, the option of removing a Trustee or eliminating the office 
altogether remains.”27 
A slightly different version of Trustee Theory is constituted by the 
Constrained Independence Approach, according to which states allow ICs to 
rule against their interests only when these decisions maximize the long-term 
value of the treaty commitments to all parties. This, however, does not mean 
that ICs are completely independent. States, in fact, can use refined 
mechanisms to limit the potential judicial overreaching and to define the 
“strategic space” in which ICs operate.28 
Hypothesis #2: the CACJ and the CCJ would be expected to provide 
ambitious interpretations of their treaties only when these are in line with 
the overarching and long-term interests of the states or of other key 
stakeholders of their systems. 
C. The Altered Politics Framework 
Under the Altered Politics Framework, ICs expand the power of states 
and of national actors.29 The specific institutional features of the so-called 
“New-Style ICs” (i.e. compulsory jurisdiction and private access) allow non-
state actors to initiate litigation, thus increasing the power of ICs and 
transforming these institutions into strategic tools for “compliance 
constituencies” to pursue their interests and goals.30 Private parties’ 
participation in international litigation, thus, merges domestic and 
international understanding of legality by making sure that compliance with 
international law becomes consistent with the respect of domestic laws. In 
the words of Alter: “ICs help alter state policy by using their institutional 
position to aid actors inside and outside of states that share the objectives 
 
independent authority to make decisions according to their best judgment or professional criteria; and 3) 
empowered to act on behalf of a beneficiary.” Alter, supra note 12, at 35. 
 26.  Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Trustee Courts and the Judicialization of International 
Regimes: the Politics of Majoritarian Activism in the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
European Union, and the World Trade Organization, 1 J.L. & CTS., 62–63 (2013).  
 27.  Alter, supra note 12, at 44. 
 28.  Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A 
Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899, 904–05 (2005). 
 29.  ALTER, supra note 21. 
 30.  ALTER, supra note 21, at 19–20.  
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inscribed into the law.”31 The conditions for this to occur are that: i) litigants 
size the IC; ii) national actors care about legality; iii) legal entrepreneurs 
invoke the IC and contribute to build compliance constituencies; and iv) 
international rules are supported by national actors.32 
Hypothesis #3: the CACJ and the CCJ would be expected to be seized 
by constituencies willing to pursue political objectives which are not 
reachable domestically. States will play along as long as powerful domestic 
elites support international norms. 
In brief, the three approaches presented above provide theoretical entry 
points for explaining why states create ICs and why ICs behave in certain 
ways. P-A theory chiefly focuses on how the self-interest of states operates 
as a constraint on ICs. Conversely, Trustee Theory and the Altered Politics 
Framework emphasize the conditions under which ICs may be able to 
overcome constraints and avoid political pushbacks. 
III. THE POLITICALLY SENSITIVE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE TWO 
COURTS 
This section presents the politically sensitive rulings of the CACJ and 
of the CCJ. As to the CCJ, these chiefly regard freedom of movement within 
the CARICOM in the Original Jurisdiction (OJ) and human rights in the 
Appellate Jurisdiction (AJ). The cases of the CACJ are different, as they 
mostly regard inter-state conflicts and separation of powers disputes between 
the constitutional organs of the SICA’s Member States. 
A. The Silent Rise of a Caribbean Human and Fundamental Rights 
Court: From Death Penalty to Indigenous Rights 
The CCJ has dealt with politically sensitive issues mainly in its AJ, 
where the Court is aimed at replacing the appeals to the JCPC in London as 
the apex judicial institution for those countries of the Caribbean that have 
ratified this jurisdiction through constitutional amendments (hitherto, 
Barbados, Guyana, Belize, and Dominica). 
Perhaps the most important of these cases was The Attorney General of 
Barbados and others v Joseph and Boyce.33 In this case, the CCJ was called 
to rule over the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty for murder 
in Barbados. In addition, the Court touched upon other important issues, such 
as its relationship with the JCPC and the effects of unincorporated 
 
 31.  ALTER, supra note 21, at 20. 
 32.  ALTER, supra note 21, at 62.  
 33.  Attorney General of Barbados v. Joseph and Boyce, CV 2 (CCJ, 2006). 
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international treaties in countries with a dualist tradition of international 
law.34 
The case had huge political connotations. Since 1994—when the JCPC 
reversed its jurisprudence on capital punishment, establishing that a 
prolonged delay of more than five years in carrying out a death sentence 
constituted “inhuman and degrading punishment”35—the Caribbean 
countries were in conflict with the English Court.36 The provisions of many 
international human rights treaties of which the Caribbean States were 
signatories, in fact, held that, in cases of appeals to an international organ by 
death row inmates, the national judiciaries were required to suspend the 
execution until a decision on the merit would be reached at the international 
level. The procedures before international human rights instruments, 
however, were often lengthy, causing delays in the execution of death row 
inmates by national authorities. The JCPC’s new jurisprudence on the death 
penalty, hence, placed the Caribbean countries in a position where they faced 
the dilemma of either being forced to violate the five years term for executing 
death row inmates set up by the same JCPC or of being in violation of the 
international human rights treaties they were members of.37 
This situation caused a significant upheaval in the Caribbean region: 
Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago denounced the international 
human rights instruments they were part of; almost at the same time, the CCJ 
was established with an appellate jurisdiction aimed at replacing the JCPC 
at the apex of the judicial systems of several Caribbean countries.38 
The decision of the CCJ in Joseph and Boyce is revealing of the Court’s 
willingness to deal with politically sensitive issues. To begin with, the CCJ 
rejected the dualist argument put forward by the Barbadian Government, 
according to which, even if ratified by the executive, international treaties 
form no part of domestic law, unless they have been incorporated by the 
legislature.39 At the same time, the CCJ did not endorse the alternative view 
offered by the JCPC, which claimed that ratified but unincorporated 
international treaties were directly effective and applicable.40 Here, the Court 
 
 34.  In the specific case, on the effect of the IACHR in Barbados, IACHR was only signed and 
ratified by the Barbadian officers but not transplanted into national law by the Parliament. 
 35.  Pratt and Morgan v. the Attorney General of Jamaica, 2. A.C., Decision on Appeal from the 
Court of Appeal of Jamaica, 35 (1994). 
 36.  At that point, the JCPC was – and for many still is – the apex court of many Caribbean States. 
 37.  Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1863–
65 (2002). 
 38.  Caserta & Madsen, supra note 14. 
 39.  Attorney General of Barbados v. Joseph & Boyce, CV 2, ¶ 55–56 (CCJ, 2006). 
 40.  The JCPC expressed this view in Lewis et al. v. Attorney General, 2 A.C., Decision on the 
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borrowed a principle already developed by the Australian High Court,41 
according to which unincorporated international treaties give rise to a 
“legitimate expectation” to the procedures established by such treaties. In the 
specific case in point, death row inmates would not be executed until 
reasonable time is allowed for the international systems to run their course.42 
Accordingly, the CCJ granted Joseph and Boyce the right to have their 
petition to the Inter-American Human Rights System heard before Barbados 
could conduct their execution.43 
Joseph and Boyce was followed by other important human and 
fundamental rights cases. One of these is Maya Leaders Alliance v. Attorney 
General of Belize,44 in which the CCJ was called to rule over a long-standing 
land rights dispute between the Belizean Government and the Mayan 
minorities of Southern Belize. This was another case in which the CCJ 
showed its willingness to become involved in politically sensitive issues. The 
CCJ upheld the constitutional rights of the Mayas against arbitrary 
deprivation of property as well as the right to protection of the law.45 In so 
doing, the Court reversed the traditional (and narrow) reading of the right to 
protection of the law, according to which this right merely encompassed 
access to independent and impartial courts.46 Conversely, the CCJ described 
the right to protection of the law in terms of a “broad spectrum right” that 
“includes not only access to the court…but also [access] to administrative 
tribunals with the power to affect constitutional rights or rights under the 
Constitution of an individual.”47 The CCJ not only acknowledged the 
existence of these rights, but also ruled that: “the right to protection of the 
law may, in appropriate cases, require the relevant organs of the state to take 
positive action in order to secure and ensure the enjoyment of basic 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals of Jamaica, 51–52, 78 (2001). The relevant provision here was Article 
4(6) of the American Convention on Human Rights, according to which: “Every person condemned to 
death shall have the right to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence, which may be 
granted in all cases. Capital punishment shall not be imposed while such petition is pending decision by 
the competent authority.” The Court noted that some Caribbean countries had also ratified other 
international human rights instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR which protect the right to life. See also Maya Leaders 
Alliance et al. v. Attorney General of Belize, 366, ¶ 54 (CCJ, 2015). 
 41.  See Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh [1995] HCA 20 183 CLR 273. See also 
Matthew Groves, Treaties and Legitimate Expectations – The Rise and Fall of Teoh in Australia, 15 
JUD’L. REV. 323, 323 (2010). 
 42.  Joseph and Boyce, supra note 8, at 11. 
 43.  Id. at 144.  
 44.  Maya Leaders Alliance, supra note 9. 
 45.  Id. at 32. 
 46.  See id. at 39. 
 47.  Id. at 49. 
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constitutional rights.”48 Finally, the CCJ granted the Mayan communities 
non-pecuniary damages to be quantified in a BZ $300.000.00 fund as a first 
step toward compliance with the Belizean Government’s duty to protect 
Maya customary land tenure.49 
B. The CCJ’s Fundamental Rights Turn on the Court’s Original 
Jurisdiction 
The CCJ has also gotten involved with politically sensitive issues in its 
OJ, where, in principle, the Court is bound to interpret and apply the RTC 
and secondary Community Law. In the period 2005−2011, this jurisdiction 
was mainly used by large companies for common market related matters.50 
From 2012, however, a different set of cases concerning freedom of 
movement of CARICOM nationals reached the Court. 
The first—and perhaps most important—among these was brought by 
a Jamaican woman, Shanique Myrie, against the State of Barbados. Myrie 
alleged that the behavior of the Barbadian border officers at the Bridgetown 
Airport—who had mistreated her and denied her access to Barbados—
constituted a violation of her human and fundamental rights; her right to 
freedom of movement within the CARICOM; and her right to non-
discrimination on the ground of nationality granted to CARICOM nationals 
by the RTC.51 
This decision is also revelatory of the CCJ’s willingness to get involved 
with politically sensitive cases. Although the Court formally rejected the 
human rights claim brought forward by Myrie stating that the Court is only 
competent to interpret and apply the RTC and secondary laws emanating 
from the Treaty,52 the judges ruled in favor of Myrie, ordering Barbados to 
pay compensatory damages for the violation of her rights under the RTC. 
Myrie had also important systemic effects, as it emboldened the protection 
of fundamental rights in the CARICOM. In this decision, the CCJ deepened 
the outreach of the doctrine of “correlative rights,” which the Court had 
established in one of its previous decisions. According to this doctrine, 
although formally the RTC does not give rights to individuals and only 
establishes obligations on the Member States, these obligations are mirrored 
by “correlative rights” when their non-fulfillment damages the interests of 
individuals.53 Following Myrie, these “correlative rights” can now be 
 
 48.  Id. at 47.  
 49.  Id. at 78. 
 50.  Caserta & Madsen, supra note 14.  
 51.  Myrie, supra note 7, at 2–4. 
 52.  Id. at 6. 
 53.  According to this doctrine, in the CARICOM, rights are not expressly given by the RTC but 
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activated at the Community level by private litigants bringing cases directly 
before the CCJ, without the exhaustion of local remedies and without the 
need of filing cases before national judges. 
Myrie was soon followed by two other disputes dealing with free 
movement in the CARICOM. In these cases, Maurice Tomlinson, a Jamaican 
LGBTI rights activist, asked the CCJ to declare the provisions of the 
Immigration Acts of both Belize and Trinidad and Tobago banning the 
entrance of homosexuals into these two countries in violation of his right to 
free movement within the CARICOM. 
The two Tomlinson cases were viewed by many as risking a backlash 
against the Court because they potentially incited a conflict between 
international human rights and local cultural sensitivities.54 It may also be 
for this reason that the CCJ formally dismissed the two cases, ruling that the 
practices of Belize and Trinidad and Tobago in relation to their Immigration 
Acts were not incompatible with the CARICOM Law.55 
Despite formally rejecting the case, in the judgment, the Court 
introduced important principles that enhance the protection of fundamental 
rights in the CARICOM through obiter dicta. Most notably, that: i) 
CARICOM Law makes the admission of homosexual nationals from other 
CARICOM States a legal requirement, notwithstanding contradictory 
positions of national Immigration Acts; and ii) that the dismissal of  
Tomlinson’s claims should not allow Belize and Trinidad and Tobago to 
indefinitely retain laws seemingly in conflict with Community Law 
obligations, as Member States are obliged to ensure that national laws, 
subsidiary legislation and administrative practices conform to CARICOM 
Law.56 
C. Litigating in the Shadow of the International Court of Justice: the 
CACJ as an Inter-State Court 
Similar to the CCJ, the CACJ did not refrain from getting involved with 
politically sensitive issues either. Two of these cases involved Nicaragua and 
Honduras and the ratification of the Lopez-Ramirez Treaty between 
Colombia and Honduras, through which several islands, marine areas, and 
 
are rather extracted from obligations that the Treaty places on Member States. See TCL v. Guyana, [2009] 
CCJ 1 (OJ). See also Salvatore Caserta & Mikael Rask Madsen, Consolidating Supranational Authority: 
the Caribbean Court of Justice Decisions in the Tomlinson Cases, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 533, 533 (2016). 
See generally DAVID BERRY, CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION LAW (2014). 
 54.  Caserta & Madsen, supra note 14. 
 55.  According to the Court, in fact, both Belize and Trinidad and Tobago have repeatedly admitted 
homosexuals – even the claimant, Mr. Tomlinson – in more than one instance. Maurice Tomlinson v. the 
State of Belize and the State of Trinidad and Tobago, [2016] CCJ 1 (OJ), at [24].  
 56.  Caserta & Madsen, supra note 5. 
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submarine areas were transferred from Nicaragua and Jamaica to Honduras 
and Colombia.57 As a reaction to the ratification of such Treaty, Nicaragua 
imposed additional taxes over the goods coming from Honduras and even 
suspended commercial relations with the latter. Shortly after, the two States 
moved troops to their respective borders, getting ready for military action. 
Honduras even declared a state of alert.58 Following these occurrences, in 
1999, Nicaragua and Honduras each filed a case before the CACJ: Nicaragua 
to ascertain the nullity of the ratification of the Lopez-Ramirez Treaty; 
Honduras to invalidate the Nicaraguan economic countermeasures as these 
allegedly violated SICA law. 
In its rulings, the CACJ revealed its proclivity for getting involved with 
politically sensitive issues. The first hint in this regard is provided by the fact 
that, even though the CACJ has formally no compulsory jurisdiction over 
territorial disputes,59 the judges accepted the cases claiming that the Court’s 
role is not limited  to deciding technical issues related to regional economic 
integration, but also to: i) transform the Central American isthmus into a 
unified and pacific nation;60 ii) “reaffirm and consolidate Central American 
self-determination;”61 and, iii) promote, in a harmonic way, the economic, 
social, cultural, and political development of the Member States and of the 
region.62 Furthermore, in deciding the merits of the cases, the Court did not 
hesitate in ruling against the two States. The CACJ, in fact, declared: i) that 
the Lopez-Ramirez Treaty infringed the principles and obligations of the 
Protocol and that Honduras was directly responsible for the violations;63 and 
 
 57.  CACJ 25-05-29-11-1999 and 26-06-03-12-1999. The dispute had originated already in 1858 
and lasted until the 1960s, when the diplomatic mediation of the Organization of American States 
persuaded the two states to submit the dispute to the ICJ, which eventually decided in favor of Honduras. 
In 1986, however, the drafting of the Lopez-Ramirez Treaty between Honduras and Colombia had 
resurrected the conflict, pushing Nicaragua to file another case before the ICJ. Yet, as the actual 
ratification of the Treaty was delayed, the controversy remained suspended until 1999, when – overnight 
– the legislature of Honduras proceeded to the ratification of the Treaty.  
 58.  Both Nicaragua & Honduras Claim Victory After Regional Court Rules on Boundary-Tariff 
Issues, NOTICEN: CENT. AM. & CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS (Dec. 6, 2001), 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/REGION%3A+BOTH+NICARAGUA+%26+HONDURAS+CLAIM+
VICTORY+AFTER+REGIONAL+COURT. . .-a080643478.  
 59.  See Costa Rica-El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras-Nicaragua-Panama: Statute of the Central 
American Court of Justice, 34 I.L.M. 921, 930 (1995) (establishing that the Court has no jurisdiction over 
territorial disputes between Member States, unless the two States formally agreed to submit the dispute 
to the CACJ). 
 60.  CACJ 25-05-29-11-1999, supra note 57, at considerando IX. 
 61.  Tegucigalpa Protocol to the Charter of the Organization of Central American States (ODECA) 
art. 4 (g), Dec. 13, 1991, 1695 U.N.T.S. 400. 
 62.  See id. at art. 3 (h).  
 63.  CACJ 25-05-29-11-1999, supra note 57, at resuelve I). See also the dissenting opinions of 
Justice Adolfo Leon Gomez and of Justice Eduardo Gauggel Rivas. 
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ii) that by imposing additional taxes over the goods coming from Honduras 
and by suspending commercial relations with the latter, Nicaragua had 
violated SICA law.64 
These two rulings are not exceptional, and they constituted the first step 
toward transforming the CACJ from a mere regional economic court into the 
ultimate Central American arbiter of inter-state disputes. In 2011, the Court 
was called to preside over another highly sensitive and long-standing 
territorial dispute involving Costa Rica and Nicaragua.65 In this case, two 
Nicaraguan NGOs asked the CACJ to stop Costa Rica from constructing a 
highway in the environmentally protected area of the Rio San Juan. The case 
assumed even more political connotations because, since the Court’s 
establishment, Costa Rica had repeatedly refused to submit to its jurisdiction 
for reasons connected to the CACJ’s broad competences. In this decision, 
the CACJ proved itself not only not to be averse to politically sensitive 
issues, but also that these types of cases are a central aspect of its 
competences. First, despite the vehement protests of the Costa Rican 
Government, the CACJ declared its jurisdiction to hear the case.66 Second, 
again ignoring the Costa Rican Government’s blistering remarks, the CACJ 
did not hesitate in condemning the State for damaging the environment and 
for having violated several international and regional treaties. 
D. Democratization through Judicial Means: the CACJ as a Regional 
Constitutional Court 
The willingness of the CACJ to deal with politically sensitive issues is 
perhaps best illustrated by the fact that, in the early 2000s, the Court was 
called to solve a high profile dispute between two former Nicaraguan 
Presidents, both members of the Liberal Party, Enrique Bolaños, and his 
predecessor, Arnoldo Alemán.67 The conflict initiated as early as 2002, when 
the newly elected Bolaños led an anti-corruption campaign, which caused 
the imprisonment of Alemán. In an attempt to escape the conviction, Alemán 
 
 64.  CACJ 26-06-03-12-1999, supra note 57, at resuelve I) and II). 
 65.  CACJ 12-06-12-2011. The tension between the two states peaked in 2010, when Nicaragua 
began to build an inter-oceanic channel in the area of the Rio San Juan. In response, Costa Rica sent 
police officers to its borders, as did Nicaragua. Costa Rica then filed a case at the ICJ alleging that the 
Nicaraguan military activities in the area constituted a breach of treaty obligations toward Costa Rica. In 
2011, the ICJ provisionally ruled that both Costa Rica and Nicaragua must refrain from sending or 
maintaining security forces in the area and that the Nicaraguan dredging was allowed, as it had been 
conducted on Nicaraguan territory. See Press Release, International Court of Justice Press Release No. 
2010/38, Costa Rica institutes proceedings against Nicaragua and requests the Court to indicate 
provisional measures (Nov. 19, 2010); See Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border 
Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, I.C.J. Rep. 2011, p. 6. 
 66.  Costa Rica-El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras-Nicaragua-Panama, supra note 59, at 932.  
 67.  CACJ 69-01-03-01-2005, supra note 10. 
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filed a case before the CACJ claiming his immunity as a member of the 
Central American Parliament (PARLACEN). The CACJ, however, rejected 
the case, ruling that the suspension of the national immunity decided by the 
Nicaraguan Parliament had also caused the decay of Alemán’s regional 
immunity. 
Having lost the first legal battle before the CACJ, Alemán attempted to 
politically isolate Bolaños by means of an agreement (El Pacto) with the 
leftist Sandinista Party. In short, the part of the Liberal Party allied with 
Alemán and the Sandinistas coalesced with the goal of passing constitutional 
reforms aimed at disempowering and eventually impeaching Bolaños, 
securing for themselves the control of key political institutions, and, 
ultimately, gaining amnesty for Alemán. Soon after El Pacto, the National 
Assembly of Nicaragua passed a bill revoking the President’s power to 
directly appoint key governmental figures. In response, President Bolaños 
filed a motion before the Nicaraguan Supreme Court. This case was, 
however, rejected by the Nicaraguan highest judicial organ, which even 
declared the section f) of Article 22 of the Statute of the CACJ 
unconstitutional and inapplicable.68 Finally, President Bolaños, in a 
desperate attempt to cling to his chair, invoked the contested Article 22 and 
dragged the Nicaraguan Parliament before the CACJ, asking the regional 
court to declare the invalidity of the constitutional reforms.69 
This case put an immense amount of strain on the CACJ, especially on 
the two Nicaraguan judges, who were called to take a stance either against 
their own Supreme Court or against their own President. Additionally, being 
that the seat of the Court was located in Nicaragua, the Court ended up in the 
midst of the Nicaraguan political debate and, during the proceedings, people 
gathered in front of the Court’s Headquarters to voice their discontent with 
the judges’ involvement in the dispute.70 The situation was so charged that 
one person close to the Court revealed that one of the two Nicaraguan judges 
avoided getting too involved with the proceedings in order to avoid 
criticisms and even retaliations against him.71 The CACJ, however, kept the 
pressure at bay. First, the Court admitted the case and even released a 
preliminary measure, asking the Nicaraguan Parliament to suspend the 
reforms while its decision was pending. Second, the Court declared the 
 
 68.  Sentencia [S.] No. 15, 29 March 2005, Sala Constitucional, [Supreme Court of Justice] p. 47, 
Cons. I (Nicar.). Article 22(f) of the Statute empowers the CACJ to rule over separation of powers 
disputes between the constitutional organs of the Member States. 
 69.  Interview n.6. 
 70.  Interview n.5.   
 71.  Interview n.7, n.8.  
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reforms initiated by the Legislative Assembly of Nicaragua in violation both 
of the Nicaraguan Constitution and of several treaties of the SICA.72 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXPERIENCE OF THE CACJ AND OF 
THE CCJ FOR THE THEORIES OF DELEGATION TO ICS 
This section analyzes how the experiences of the CACJ and of the CCJ 
relate to the theories of delegation discussed in section II, namely, P-A 
Theory, Trustee Theories, and the Altered Politics Framework. 
As to the P-A Theory, the experiences of the CACJ and of the CCJ 
contradict many of its main assumptions. The two Courts did not act 
consistently with the wishes of their principals. Although the founders of the 
Courts initially provided them with far-reaching powers, once these were up 
and running, both their Member States and key Central American and 
Caribbean legal and political elites repeatedly—and rather explicitly—
threatened to withdraw their support if the two Courts got too involved with 
politically sensitive issues. Hence, by presiding over claims involving human 
and fundamental rights (the CCJ) and inter-state and separation of powers 
within the constitutional organs of the Member States issues (the CACJ), 
both Courts defied the interests of their principals. More specifically, the 
rulings presented above placed the CACJ and the CCJ at odds with the 
interests of many of their Member States, according to which both the SICA 
and the CARICOM are mere fora for handling diplomatic and trade matters, 
and not supranational legal communities aimed at protecting and enforcing 
the rule of law and democratic governance. The experiences of the CACJ 
and of the CCJ also contradict P-A Theory because, although the two Courts 
have often gone against the interests of their Member States, these have not 
punished them for overstepping their authority. As to the CCJ, although 
discontent with the outcome of Myrie, Barbados complied with the decision 
without challenging the authority and legitimacy of the Court. Moreover, 
regardless of the Court’s highly political and controversial judgments in 
Pratt and Morgan and The Maya cases, the authority of the CCJ in its 
Appellate Jurisdiction has increased and several undecided states even took 
significant steps to fully ratify such jurisdiction.73 As to the CACJ, the 
Member States of the SICA have attempted to curtail the Court’s 
competencies, in 1997, with the Declaration of Panama II, again, in 1998, 
 
 72.  See CACJ 69-01-03-01-2005, supra note 10, at 25–26. 
 73.  Dominica accessed the Appellate Jurisdiction in 2015, while several East Caribbean countries 
began consultations in relation to their accession to the Court. See Media Release, Caribbean Court of 
Justice, CCJ President Travels to Antigua for Initial Consultations (Aug. 20, 2015),  
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/news/ccj-president-travels-to-antigua-for-initial-consultations. 
On the authority of the CCJ, see generally Caserta & Madsen, supra note 14.  
CASERTA PUBLICATION VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2017  1:44 PM 
76 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 28:59 
with the Declaration of Managua, and, finally, in 2003-2004, in two 
Presidential Meetings held in Belize and Guatemala. These attempts, 
however, remained un-executed for lack of political consensus at both the 
national and regional level, thus leaving the competencies of the CACJ 
intact.74 
The Trustee Theories, conversely, provide valuable insights for 
explaining the experiences of the CACJ and of the CCJ. The Central 
American and Caribbean judges did not behave as mere agents of their 
delegating authorities, but as independent professionals attempting to bring 
their own legitimacy and authority to the two Courts. Moreover, the judges 
not only produced bold rulings on very sensitive topics, but they also 
justified their claims on legal grounds by relying on their “superior” 
expertise and knowledge of the relevant treaties. Trustee Theories are finally 
corroborated by the fact that the two Courts embarked in ambitious readings 
of their treaties to make themselves palatable to broader pools of 
“compliance partners,”75 making them the beneficiaries of their 
jurisprudence, as I  will discuss in detail in Section V of the paper. 
Other assumptions of Trustee Theories, however, do not entirely fit the 
Central American and Caribbean experiences. Trustee Theories claim that 
ICs become effective when they enjoy the institutional support of the other 
organs of their communities, such as the Heads of Government and 
Commissions and/or Regional Secretariats.76 This is not the case in Central 
America or in the Caribbean, where both Courts were (and are) not supported 
by other institutional actors in developing their case-law.77 Moreover, 
according to Trustee Theories, ICs are more likely to produce ambitious 
rulings when significant disputes of non-compliance with treaty law are 
regularly brought to their attention.78 This does not occur in Central America 
or in the Caribbean, where non-compliance disputes with treaty law are 
preferably solved through diplomatic and political channels rather than 
through adjudication.79 
The CACJ and the CCJ also defy some of the assumptions of the 
Constrained Independent Theory, especially regarding the part of the 
 
 74.  METCALF & PAPAGEORGIOU, supra note 4, at 97–103. 
 75.  Compliance partners are domestic and transnational actors who “either orchestrate compliance 
or construct counter-pressures that alter the political balance in favor of policies that better cohere with 
international legal obligations.” ALTER, supra note 21, at 20. 
 76.  See generally JONAS TALLBERG, MAKING STATES COMPLY: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE & THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTERNAL MARKET (1999). 
 77.  See generally Caserta, supra note 3. 
 78.  Sweet & Brunell, supra note 26, at 62–63. 
 79.  See O’Brien & Foadi, supra note 4, at 346–47; see generally OTILIO MIRANDA, DERECHO DE 
LA COMUNIDAD CENTROAMERICANA (2013). 
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approach that claims that states establish independent ICs to promote the 
credibility of their commitments.80 The Central American and Caribbean 
States established the two Courts chiefly to enforce trade liberalization and 
to limit the widespread disregard of SICA and CARICOM laws and policies. 
Yet, both Courts have largely failed at enforcing market integration 
commitments both in terms of number of cases decided and in terms of the 
impact of their Community Law jurisprudence on the realities of Central 
American and Caribbean integration.81 
The Altered Politics Framework also provides valuable insights for 
explaining the experiences of the CACJ and the CCJ. In line with this model, 
both Courts have taken into consideration the interest of not only the 
Governments of their Member States, but also those of broader sets of 
“compliance constituencies” when deciding their cases. One key assumption 
of the Altered Politics Framework, however, is not present in Central 
America and the Caribbean. International law, human and fundamental 
rights, as well as democratization and pacification issues do not necessarily 
enjoy the political support of those actors who are in power in the national 
and regional political arenas, such as the SICA and CARICOM Heads of 
Government and the national judges. Right before the beginning of the CCJ’s 
operations, the heated conflict between the JCPC and many Caribbean 
countries on death penalty issues resulted in widespread skepticism 
regarding international law and human rights throughout the whole region.82 
While the passing of time has softened the Caribbean turmoil on such topics, 
a general lack of support for these instruments remains. Similarly, the 
enthusiasm toward democratization and pacification that permeated the 
Central American region during the late 1980s and early 1990s soon 
softened, and, still today, the countries of the isthmus are struggling to 
complete their transition to democracy.83 Hence, the claim that the CACJ and 
the CCJ  assist governments and other national actors in adopting policies 
that may be domestically controversial but consistent with international law 
does not find full empirical confirmation.84 
In addition to these theory-specific assessments, other more general 
considerations can be brought forward to corroborate the point already 
expressed in this section. Delegation theories cannot entirely account for the 
 
 80.  See generally Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 20.  
 81.  Interview n.9. See also Caserta, supra note 3. 
 82.  See Helfer, supra note 37.  
 83.  See, e.g., ELLEN MOODIE, EL SALVADOR IN THE AFTERMATH OF PEACE: CRIME, UNCERTAINTY 
AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (2010); CENTRAL AMERICA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: LIVING 
TRANSITION AND REIMAGINING DEMOCRACY (Jennifer L. Burrell & Ellen Moodie eds., 2013). 
 84.  See generally ALTER, supra note 21.  
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behavior of both the CACJ and of the CCJ because their analysis chiefly 
focuses on the political dynamics related to the formal act of empowerment. 
In turn, this means that these theories can only account for why states create 
ICs at a specific point in time and that they do not (and cannot) address 
broader issues related to the process of institutionalization of ICs or to what 
direction ICs may take once established. 
The Theories of delegation also seem to imply that delegating states are 
the only relevant actors whose interests must be unveiled if one wants to 
understand the creation as well as the reasons of the behavior of an IC.85 Yet, 
the fact that both the CACJ and the CCJ challenged the interests of their 
Member States, and that these States have not reacted negatively in response, 
reveal that the question of compliance or non-compliance with an IC’s 
decision is more complex than what these Theories tend to suggest and that 
it involves a multitude of actors and interests beyond states. In this regard, 
Trustee Theories and the Altered Politics Framework are more suited to 
explain the CACJ and the CCJ as they expand the analysis to a broader pool 
of actors. Yet, even these two theories are not entirely satisfactory as they, 
ultimately, rely on pre-defined and rationalist constructions of the interests 
of the agents interacting with ICs. Both Trustee Theories and the Altered 
Politics Framework frame ICs in terms of welfare-improving solutions to 
problems of incomplete information and high-transaction costs between 
states and other rational actors. Yet, as it will be shown in the following 
section of the paper, the interests of individual actors and groups hardly 
follow pre-defined trajectories. Interests are, in fact, socially constructed 
and, either directly or indirectly, influenced by social rules, cultural contents, 
visions of the world, ideas of legality and other similar factors.86 
In sum, although some of the above discussed theories provide useful 
insights for understanding the CACJ and of the CCJ, each theory alone 
cannot fully account for the two Courts’ involvement with politically 
sensitive issues. 
 
 85.  In this discussion, it is worth adding that, recent scholarship has pointed out that States are not 
monolithic institutions with uniform and singularly identifiable interests as these theories seem to assume. 
On the contrary, States are disaggregated in many independent flows of power characterized by technical 
skills, each with their own specific interest to protect and fulfill. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A 
NEW WORLD ORDER 12 (2009).  
 86.  This is in line with constructivist and sociological approaches to international organizations and 
courts. See, e.g., MICHAEL N. BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 2 (2004); Neil Fligstein, Markets as Politics: A 
Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions, 61 AMERICAN SOC. REV. 656, 660 (1996); Antoine 
Vauchez, The Force of a Weak Field: Law and Lawyers in the Government of the European Union (For 
a Renewed Research Agenda), 2 INT. POL. SOC. 128, 131 (2008); Madsen & Dezalay, supra note 13. 
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V. BRINGING THE SOCIAL BACK IN: EXPLAINING THE 
INVOLVEMENT OF THE CACJ AND OF THE CCJ WITH 
POLITICALLY SENSITIVE DISPUTES 
If the theories discussed above cannot fully grasp the reasons why the 
CACJ and CCJ have gotten involved with politically sensitive issues, how 
can we theoretically make sense of the behavior of these two Courts? 
Transnational Field Theory and Reflexive Sociology provide the 
theoretical and methodological tools to answer this puzzle. These theories 
approach ICs—and more generally (legal) institutions—not in terms of 
autonomous entities that develop and change through endogenous and self-
referential logics, but rather as social constructions deeply embedded in 
differentiated fields of power, which shape their activities through a variety 
of processes (i.e., professional interests, visions of law, ideologies, 
education, socialization, and so on).87 
The focus of the analysis, hence, shifts from a trans-governmentalist 
line of thinking—according to which international institutions are the spinoff 
of rationally constructed interests of transnational constellations of agents—
to a more sociologically grounded vision that constructs ICs in terms of 
institutional crystallizations of diverging and competing national modes of 
production, professional interests, and visions of law.88 In other words, 
Transnational Field Theory and Reflexive Sociology, by allowing an 
examination of the interplay between the agency of ICs and the 
transformation of the social structures in which they act and evolve, shed 
light on the making of these institutions, pinpointing to how larger societal 
and geopolitical forces impact the evolution of ICs and of their behavior.89 
In this regard, the Bourdieusian notion of the field90 is an especially 
pertinent research tool. The field, in fact: “populates these institutions [ICs] 
with competing actors and tracks their socialization, personal trajectories, 
and professional careers,” thus allowing to trace: “the socio-genesis of 
transnational institutions and groups as well as the power relations in which 
they are embedded.”91 
 
 87.  See Vauchez, supra note 86. See also Madsen & Dezalay, supra note 13. 
 88.  Similar in this regard, to what was claimed by the sociology of organizations. See generally, 
e.g., Paul J. Di Maggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphsim and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 150 (1983); RICHARD W. SCOTT, 
ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS 20 (1994). 
 89.  Madsen, supra note 13, at 448–49. 
 90.  Social fields are “spaces of contestation over defining the law in which different agents occupy 
positions relative to the portfolio of capitals they can muster and which are ‘capitalized’ according to the 
logic of the specific field in question.”  Id. at 400. 
 91.  Vauchez, supra note 86. 
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In what follows, it  will become clear that power relations, professional 
practices, interests, visions of the world, and the national positioning of the 
Central American and Caribbean legal and political elites in their respective 
legal fields have played a fundamental role in shaping both the institutional 
outlook and—most importantly—the practices of the CACJ and of the CCJ, 
pushing them to go beyond their roles as regional economic courts and to 
explore the full extension of their powers. 
The paper does not provide a full-fledged analysis of the Central 
American and Caribbean legal fields. I rather use the logic of the field to 
highlight two different—yet inherently correlated—aspects, which are of 
pivotal importance for understanding the involvement of the two Courts with 
politically sensitive issues: i) the trans-historical trajectories of the main 
structuring forces of the Central American and Caribbean legal fields; and 
ii) the professional paths of the judges eventually chosen to sit on the benches 
of the two Courts, which are strongly linked to these structural dynamics. 
A. The Protracted Geneses of the CACJ and the CCJ 
In the two following sub-sections, I provide a socio-genesis of the two 
ICs object of enquiry, showing that the need of establishing two regional 
economic Courts to support the implementation of the policies of the SICA 
and the CARICOM was only the most recent development characterizing the 
Central American and Caribbean legal fields. Conversely, the process of 
creation of the two Courts was significantly shaped by other—very 
different—structural forces that have characterized the Central American 
and Caribbean legal fields over time. These forces are: decolonization from 
the United Kingdom in the Caribbean, and pacification through legal and 
judicial means in Central America. 
Ultimately, this shows that both Courts are not only mere byproducts of 
the increased legalization of international relations that followed the end of 
the Cold War,92 but that this legalization layered on top of several other 
forms of legality, interests, normative ideas, and social practices that have 
characterized the Central American and Caribbean legal fields over time. 
1. The Creation of the CCJ at the Crossroads of Decolonization and 
Regional Integration 
The CCJ is the institutional crystallization of two divergent movements 
of the Caribbean legal field.93 The first is the one correctly captured by the 
main narrative related to the CCJ, according to which the Court is an EU-
 
 92.  See LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 17 (Judith L. Goldstein, et al. eds., 2001); ALTER, 
supra note 21.  
 93.  Caserta & Madsen, supra note 14, at 90.  
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style regional economic court94 aimed at reviving the CARICOM, which, up 
to that point, had been highly dysfunctional and ineffective at securing 
compliance of the Member States with its policies.95 
Once the Court is approached from a more trans-historical and actor-
based perspective, however, it becomes apparent that, above and beyond 
being the judicial institution of the CARICOM, the present CCJ constitutes 
the last of several failed attempts at replacing the JCPC as the apex court of 
the former English West Indian colonies. 
The first proposal of a Caribbean Court of Appeal was first advanced in 
1901, when a Jamaican newspaper suggested to replace the system of 
colonial justice with a West Indian Court of Appeal.96 Similar proposals were 
advanced in 1932 at the Conference of Roseau and in 1947 at the Montego 
Bay Conference. An actual Caribbean Court of Appeal was eventually 
established to replace the JCPC as part of the Federation of the West Indies 
in 1958. Yet, as the Federation crashed in 1962 and the Caribbean States 
achieved their independence singularly, many of them opted for maintaining 
the JCPC as their court of last resort. The discussions related to the creation 
of a local court to replace the JCPC, however, continued intermittently until 
the 1990s, when the Caribbean legal professions entered into a heated 
conflict with the JCPC on issues related to the constitutionality of mandatory 
death penalty for murder granted by many constitutions of the States of the 
region. Thereafter—in conjunction with the need of vesting the CARICOM 
with a Community Court to respond to the challenges posed by the end of 
the Cold War—the present CCJ was established as both an appellate and an 
international court.97 
This double movement characterizing the long period of gestation of 
the Court significantly shaped the constellation of the Caribbean legal field. 
In the shadow of these two structural forces, a professional and power 
struggle between two social groupings of lawyers, each with very different 
ideas related to Caribbean Community Law, took place. Initially, the field 
was dominated by a relatively small but powerful group of English-educated 
Caribbean lawyers. Central figures of this social constellation of legal 
 
 94.  See, e.g., Derek O’Brien & Sonia Morano-Foadi, The Caribbean Court of Justice and Legal 
Integration within CARICOM: Some Lessons from the European Community, 8 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & 
TRIBS. 399, 400 (2009). 
 95.  See, e.g., THE WEST INDIAN COMM’N, TIME FOR ACTION: REPORT OF THE WEST INDIAN 
COMMISSION (1992); O’Brien & Foadi, supra note 4, at 347. 
 96.  The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, THE DAILY GLEANER, Mar. 6, 1901, 
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/about-the-ccj/ccj-concept-to-reality.  
 97.  For a more detailed history of these developments, see SPENCER MAWBY, ORDERING 
INDEPENDENCE: THE END OF EMPIRE IN THE ANGLOPHONE CARIBBEAN (1947-1969) 150 (2012). See 
also, Caserta & Madsen, supra note 14, at 90.  
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professionals were, among others: Karl Hudson Phillips,98 Ramesh 
Lawrence Maharaj,99 Fenton Ramsahoye,100 as well as Michael de la Bastide 
and Sir Dennis Byron, who would later become Presidents of the CCJ.101 
Because of the absence of a Faculty of Law in the region,102 these 
individuals obtained their legal education in the United Kingdom. During 
this English passage, these lawyers developed specific sensitivities related to 
Caribbean Community Law both as an extension of (English) human and 
fundamental rights and as a (hypothetical) tool for completing the circle of 
Caribbean independence from its metropolitan power. Eventually, when 
these lawyers returned to the Caribbean, they ended up monopolizing the 
legal job market practicing law transnationally in all jurisdictions of the 
Caribbean and before the JCPC.103 
The strong connection to the colonial metropolis developed by this old 
generation of Caribbean lawyers instilled in them, and in many other 
Caribbean lawyers, a strong skepticism related to any kind of local legal 
knowledge. Importantly, for a long time, the old lawyers were suspicious in 
relation to the project of a Caribbean Court, as they feared that replacing the 
JCPC with a local judicial institution would curtail human and fundamental 
rights standards in the region. At the same time, the creation of a local court 
 
 98.  Mr. Hudson Phillips graduated in law at the University of Cambridge in 1956 and called at the 
bar at Gray’s Inn, London. He served as member of the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago from 1966 to 
1976. From 1969 to 1973, he was appointed as Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs of Trinidad 
and Tobago. He made a name for himself as a trans-Caribbean lawyer as he practiced law in several 
jurisdictions. He participated in the murder trial of the Grenadian Prime Minister – Mr. Maurice Bishop 
– as well as in many high-profile cases throughout the Caribbean. In 1999 he was also appointed as 
President of the Law Association of Trinidad and Tobago. In 2003, he was appointed as the first judge of 
the International Criminal Court. 
 99.  Mr. Maharaj graduated in law in London in 1969 and called at the bar at Inner Temple. He was 
admitted to practice in several Caribbean countries, such as Trinidad and Tobago, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, and Grenada. He was a member of the Trinidadian Parliament in more than one legislature 
and he served as Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago from 2000. 
 100.  Mr. Ramsahoye graduated in law at the London University in 1953, called to bar at Lincoln’s 
Inn in 1953, awarded a PhD in Comparative Land Law from the London School of Economics and 
Political Sciences in 1959. He is licensed under the bars in Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, 
Jamaica, and the Territories of the Eastern Caribbean included Montserrat, and the British Virgin Islands. 
He holds the record for making the most appearances before the JCPC in the Caribbean. Additionally, he 
has been member of the Guyanese Parliament from 1961 to 1973 and Attorney General of Guyana from 
1961 to 1964. 
 101.  I will discuss the professional profiles of both Mr. de la Bastide and Sir Byron in the following 
sub-section of the paper. 
 102.  The first local Faculty of Law was established only in 1970 in Barbados. The Faculty of Law, 
About Us, THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES, https://www.cavehill.uwi.edu/Law/about-us.aspx (last 
visited Oct.24, 2017). This was soon followed by other Caribbean Faculties of Law certified to issue legal 
diplomas in Jamaica (1973), Trinidad & Tobago (1973) and Bahamas (1998). Legal studies are now also 
available in Guyana, http://uog.edu.gy/faculties/fss/department-of-law. 
 103.  Caserta & Madsen, supra note 14, at 93–96.  
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contested their professional privileges and power, as this directly challenged 
the hegemony of the English Common Law as the law of the land of the 
Caribbean States.104 
By the 1970s, however, the old lawyers’ unique position of power in 
the field began to be challenged by a newer generation of Caribbean-
educated lawyers.105 A key role in this development was played by the 
opening of the Faculty of Law of the University of West Indies (UWI) in 
Barbados in 1970, which, over time, nurtured a generation of Caribbean 
lawyers less skeptical towards the idea of replacing the appeals to the JCPC 
with a local Court of Appeal and supportive of the idea of strengthening the 
integration project by, among other things, equipping the CARICOM with 
an international judicial institution.106 These two competing professional and 
ideological views related to Caribbean Community Law remained in conflict 
until the early 2000s, when, as a result of the new JCPC human rights 
jurisprudence on capital punishment, both the young and the old Caribbean 
lawyers coalesced to establish the present CCJ with both Appellate and 
Original Jurisdictions. 
This diachronic and actor-based socio-genesis of the CCJ provides 
important evidence for explaining the Court’s involvement in politically 
sensitive issues. From this history, it emerges that the present CCJ is not only 
a recent byproduct of the legalization process triggered by the end of the 
Cold War, but also an institutional crystallization of continuous and 
overlapping dialectics between the different levels of structures and 
discourses of power at play in the emerging field of Caribbean law over the 
course of history. 
This is not mere historical curiosity, as the equilibrium of power of the 
field surrounding the CCJ remains rather fragile even today. The power 
battle between the older and the younger lawyers over the definition of 
Caribbean Community Law is still ongoing. This can be seen, for example, 
in that the widespread support enjoyed by the CCJ at the end of the 1990s, 
which stemmed from the outrage against the death penalty rulings of the 
JCPC, had already vanished when the Court began its operations in 2005. At 
this point, a new set of critics backed up by the English-educated elites began 
 
 104.  According to one interviewee, several law firms in Trinidad specialize in cases before the Privy 
Council. They have generally been opposed to the CCJ for fear of losing clients. Interview n. 3. 
 105.  1970 is the year in which the first truly Caribbean Faculty of Law was established in the context 
of the University of the West Indies. See, The Faculty of Law, About Us, THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST 
INDIES, https://www.cavehill.uwi.edu/Law/about-us.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).  
 106.  See Caserta & Madsen, supra note 14, at 95–96.  
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to label the newly established tribunal a “hanging court,” a court specifically 
set up to continue the use of capital punishment in the Caribbean.107 
It is, thus, not by chance that one of the first, and perhaps most 
important, cases decided by the present CCJ concerned precisely death 
penalty issues and the CCJ’s relationship with  the JCPC. Likewise, it is not 
accidental that the Court is transforming its international jurisdiction from a 
venue for trade dispute into one dedicated to regional enforcement of human 
and fundamental rights, thus showing to its constituencies to be a Court able 
to handle the Caribbean system of justice. 
In conclusion, all of the above shows that the idea of establishing a 
regional court to deal with the technicalities of Caribbean economic 
integration was only a relatively recent occurrence that layered on top of a 
long-lasting discourse of politically sensitive ideas and power, mostly 
centered on decolonization, as well as human and fundamental rights. For 
more than a century, the main structuring forces of the Caribbean legal 
field—and, accordingly, the main professional interests and visions of law 
of the legal and political elites within that field—revolved not so much 
around the idea of economically and legally integrating the region, but rather 
around the more politically contested production of a local jurisprudence on 
human and fundamental rights able to end the post-colonial legal and 
political dependence of the Caribbean from the JCPC and the United 
Kingdom. This, in my view, contributes to explaining the CCJ’s 
predisposition—or at least the missing reluctance—towards getting involved 
with politically sensitive issues. 
2. The Creation of the CACJ at the Crossroads of Pacification and 
Regional Integration 
Similar to the CCJ, the CACJ is likewise not a mere byproduct of the 
legalization of Central American economic integration triggered by the end 
of the Cold War, but the institutional crystallization of the different 
movements that characterized the Central American social and legal fields 
over time. Also in the case of the CACJ, the first of these movements has 
been highlighted by the scholarship on the CACJ, according to which the 
Court is an EU-style regional economic court aimed at enforcing the policies 
of the SICA.108 However, once the Court is approached from a trans-
historical and actor-based perspective, it becomes clear that the need to 
establish a regional economic court in Central American is a relatively recent 
 
 107.  See, e.g., Leonard Birdsong, The Formation of the Caribbean Court of Justice: The Sunset of 
British Colonial Rule in the English Speaking Caribbean, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. Rev. 197, 203 
(2005). 
 108.  See, e.g., METCALF & PAPAGEORGIOU, supra note 4, at 19–20.  
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development, and that the CACJ is also—if not above all—the last attempt 
at creating an IC to pacify and democratize Central America by legal and 
judicial means.109 
The argument is even more compelling than in the case of the CCJ, 
because several international judicial institutions aimed at pacifying the 
Central American region actually existed before the present CACJ. The most 
important of these attempts was made in 1907, when the Cartago Court—the 
first IC in world history—was established with the task of “maintaining 
peace and harmony inalterably […] without being obliged to resort in any 
case to the employment of force,”110 and, ultimately, of representing the 
“national conscience of Central America.”111 While the Cartago Court was 
short lived,112 the idea of pacifying Central America by means of an 
international judicial institution persisted up until the early 1990s, when, in 
conjunction with the peace negotiations of Esquipulas I and II and the 
reformation of the system of Central American regional economic 
integration, the present CACJ was established.113 
This double movement characterizing the Central American legal field 
holds key explanatory value for understanding the CACJ’s involvement in 
politically sensitive issues. The two structuring forces of the field 
significantly influenced the general constellation of the Central American 
 
 109.  The first proposals for a regional court were advanced in the early 20th Century, when the States 
of the region – under the auspices of the United States – created several arbitral tribunals and courts in an 
effort to soften their political and territorial controversies. THOMAS L. KARNES, THE FAILURE OF UNION: 
CENTRAL AMERICA 1824–1975 (1976). 
 110.  Preamble of the Convention. 
 111.  Id., at Article 13.  
 112.  The Court was shut down in 1918, after it was called to rule over two highly political cases 
concerning the exclusive right for building a second inter-oceanic channel through Nicaragua granted to 
the United States by the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty. CARLOS JOSÉ GUTIÉRREZ G., LA CORTE DE CARTAGO 
137 (2009). 
 113.  In 1921, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador established a regional Supreme 
Court to reduce the legal differences between the States. In 1922, the International Central American 
Tribunal was established with the power to rule over any controversy arising between them, whatever its 
nature or origin might be. This Tribunal was ratified by four states (El Salvador declined to ratify it), and 
it remained in force until 1934. Manley O. Hudson, The Central American Court of Justice, AM. J. INT’L 
L. 759, 783–84 (1932). In 1962, in the framework of the Organization of Central American States 
(ODECA), a Corte de Justicia Centroamericana was established with the power to rule over every 
conflict arising between the Member States. Article 14 and 15 of the Second Charter of the ODECA. 
Carta de la Organizacion Estados Centroamericanos (ODECA), Costa Rica-Nicar.-Hond.-El Sal.-Guat., 
Oct. 14, 1951, full text of the Treaty is available at http://www.rijia.org/assets/1carta-de-la-organizacion-
de-la-odeca.pdf. This institution, however, was never called to decide any relevant issue. See, ORLANDO 
MEJÍA HERRERA, LA UNIÓN EUROPEA COMO MODELO DE INTEGRACIÓN: ANÁLISIS COMPARATIVO DEL 
SISTEMA DE LA INTEGRACIÓN CENTROAMERICANA 442 (2008). Finally, the idea of a regional court to 
pacify the region was resurrected at the beginning of the 1990s, during the peace negotiations of 
Esquipulas I and II and was coupled with the need of establishing a Community law Court in the context 
of the creation of the SICA.  
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legal field, which ended up being characterized by two main views related 
to regional laws and institutions. 
For more than a century, the field—together with the main interests and 
ideology of the lawyers willing to build a Central American court—revolved 
more around the dream of pacifying a seemingly uniform yet utterly divided 
region rather than around regional economic integration. The fulfillment of 
such a dream, however, was not—or at least not only—related to the 
development of a technical and apolitical system of Community norms 
aimed at building a common market, but rather with the creation of 
institutional and legal tools able to mend all the conflicts of the region and 
to enforce the rule of law at the national and regional levels.114 
In the early 1950s, however, the balance of power within the field was 
altered, and the movement related to pacification through international and 
constitutional law was paralleled by a project focused on economic 
development through international organizations. It is in this context that the 
Organization of Central American States (ODECA) (1951) and the Central 
American Common Market (CACM) (1962) were established.115 Initially, 
the ODECA and the CACM did not envision the establishment of judicial 
institutions, as the main actors of the systems believed that regional 
integration was a mere intergovernmental affair.116 Over time, however, the 
ODECA and the CACM nurtured a new generation of lawyers, whose 
professional orientation and interests leaned more towards developing some 
form of legalized and judicialized version of Central American integration. 
Importantly, the two movements highlighted above—related to 
pacification and regional economic integration respectively— merged 
during the 1990s, when the present CACJ was established in the context of 
the reformation of the regional integration project and of the peace 
negotiations of Esquipulas I and II. In connection to this, it is of pivotal 
importance to mention that, during the negotiations leading to the 
establishment of the present CACJ, a close network of powerful lawyers—
the Presidents of the Supreme Court of the Central American States—took 
the lead in drafting the Statute of the Court. A few years before the Court’s 
opening, while the Central American Heads of Government were finalizing 
both the peace negotiations of Esquipulas and the reforms leading to the  
SICA, the judges of the Supreme Court had reestablished an old and highly 
 
 114.  Interviews n.7, n.8.  
 115.  RAFAEL A. SANCHEZ SANCHEZ, THE POLITICS OF CENTRAL AMERICAN INTEGRATION 51 
(2009). 
 116.  Although, formally, the Carta de San Salvador II, in amending the ODECA, formally created 
a Central American Court of Justice. Carta de la Organizacion Estados Centroamericanos (ODECA), art. 
2, Dec. 12, 1962, available at http://www.rijia.org/assets/1carta-de-la-organizacion-de-la-odeca.pdf. 
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respected institution of Central American legal history—the Central 
American Judicial Council—with the goal of bonding the judicial powers of 
the Central American States and of suggesting reforms aimed at smoothing 
out the legal differences among them.117 Hence, once Heads of Government 
realized that the future SICA had to also encompass the establishment of a 
regional (economic) court, they delegated to the judges at the Judicial 
Council the task of drafting the Statute of the SICA Court. 
Differently from the Heads of Government, who wanted to equip the 
SICA with an EU-style regional economic court, the judges at the Judicial 
Council were part of those lawyers who envisioned Central American law as 
a tool for democratization and pacification. Accordingly, in drafting the 
Statute of the Court, they did not only create a Court specialized in building 
a common market, but also an institution aimed at continuing the tradition of 
regional judicial institutions designed to pacify and democratize the Central 
American region by legal means.118 
In so doing, they deliberately revived the institutional make-up and 
ideology of the—for them—mythical Cartago Court. Similar to the old 
Court, the CACJ was vested with the task of: a) “representing the national 
conscience of Central America;” and b) “being the depository and the 
guardian of the values that constitute the Central American nationality.”119 
Moreover, in addition to the EU-like Community Law jurisdiction requested 
by the Heads of Government, the judges delegated to the CACJ several 
competencies clearly aimed at making the CACJ an institution able to make 
a difference in the Central American pacification and democratization 
process. Most notably, the power to rule in inter-state conflicts and in 
separation of powers disputes within the constitutional organs of the Member 
States.120 Finally, once the judges finalized the proposal for the Statute of the 
CACJ, they sent it to the Heads of Government, who approved and ratified 
it without further changes. 
Also in the case of the CACJ, this diachronic and actor-based analysis 
provides key evidence for explaining the Court’s involvement in politically 
sensitive issues. The history prior to the establishment of the present CACJ 
reveals that the Court is not only a product of the legalization process 
triggered by the end of the Cold War, but also the resultant of several and 
overlapping dialectics between the different levels of structures and 
discourses of power that had shaped the emerging field of Central American 
 
 117.  It is actually in this context that the first proposal for a CACJ aimed at fostering the process of 
pacification of Central America was advanced.  
 118.  Interviews n.7, n.8, n.9.  
 119.  Statute of the Central American Court of Justice, supra note 1, at 10.  
 120.  See id. at 13. 
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law over time. Most notably, democratization and pacification through legal 
and judicial means. 
Similar to the case of the CCJ, this is not a mere historical curiosity. 
The CACJ’s involvement in politically sensitive issues is a consequence of 
the fact that the main structuring forces of the Central American legal field—
and accordingly the main professional interests and visions of law of the 
legal and political elites within such field—focused not only on 
economically and legally integrating the region, but also—and above all—
on issues related to the pacification and democratization of the Central 
American region. The idea of establishing a regional economic court to foster 
integration was, henceforth, a relatively recent occurrence that layered on 
top of a long-lasting discourses of ideas and power, mostly centered on 
pacification and democratization. This, in my view, explains the 
predisposition—or at least the missing reluctance—of the CACJ in getting 
involved with politically sensitive issues. 
B. Career Paths of the Judges of the CACJ and of the CCJ and Influence 
in the Two Courts’ Activities. 
Additional evidence accounting for the involvement of the CACJ and 
the CCJ in politically sensitive issues is provided by the career paths of the 
judges eventually chosen to constitute the benches of the two Courts, by their 
professional networks, and by their positioning within the Central American 
and Caribbean legal fields. 
Making sense of common cognitive and normative frameworks requires 
accounting for the personal ties, connections, visions of the world, and 
professional interests of those individuals who have guided such 
constructions.121 This is even more compelling with regard to weakly 
structured and still fragmented polities, like the Central American and the 
Caribbean ones, where the existence and formation of trans-national and 
cross-sectoral groupings of professionals are instrumental to the progressive 
framing of regional laws. 
1. The Judges of the CCJ as a Microcosm of the Caribbean Legal Field 
The professional profiles of the judges eventually chosen for the bench 
of the CCJ constitute a microcosm of the socio-political struggles of the 
Caribbean legal field, including the different constructions of transnational 
law between English Common Law and Caribbean Community Law and the 
 
 121.  See generally Antoine Vauchez, The Making of the European Union’s Constitutional 
Foundations: the Brokering role of Legal Enterpreneurs and Networks, in TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS 
IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION: GOVERNING EUROPE 1945-83 (Wolfram Kaiser et al. eds., 2010). 
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opposed constituencies that characterized the legal history of the region (the 
older and the younger lawyers). 
In addition to individuals with a clear expertise in Caribbean 
Community Law,122 the majority of the CCJ’s judges are specialized in 
constitutional and public international law; two of them were even appointed 
as judges at the JCPC right before being called at the CCJ. Key figures in 
this regard are the two Presidents of the Court, Michael de la Bastide and Sir 
Dennis Byron. Besides being obvious supporters of the project of the 
CARICOM, they were both well-known members of the English-educated 
Caribbean legal elites, and, like them, they envisioned Caribbean 
Community Law not only in terms of economic law but, mostly, in terms of 
(national and international) human and fundamental rights. Both de la 
Bastide and Sir Byron are what contemporary sociology defines as members 
of a “transnational power elite,” lawyers able to practice law across legal 
cultures and systems by making use of their transnational legal education and 
networks.123 
The very first President of the CCJ—Michael de la Bastide—was a 
well-known pan-Caribbean lawyer, former President of the Law 
Association, and former Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago. He graduated 
from Oxford in 1959/60 and became member of the Gray’s Inn in London 
(1956); he was even appointed to the JCPC in 2004, less than three weeks 
before accepting the role of President of the CCJ.124 In Trinidad and Tobago, 
his career involved key venues of the legal and political elite: he had been 
Queen’s Council (QC), independent Senator, a member of various 
government commissions, Crown Counsel in the office of the Attorney 
General, and, finally, Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago from 1995 to 
2002. Most importantly, de la Bastide was known as a strong supporter of 
 
 122.  Two judges of the CCJ had a clear expertise in CARICOM Law. Justice Duke Pollard (Guyana) 
studied at the University of London and had been the Legal Advisor of the Commonwealth Secretariat, 
as well as the CARICOM Secretariat. At the time of his appointment, Justice Pollard had made himself a 
name as an expert jurist in international law, international economic law, the Law of the Sea, the Law of 
Treaties, as well as general integration law and economic integration law. He was clearly meant to be the 
CARICOM Law expert of the bench. In 2010 Justice Pollard retired and he was replaced by a lawyer 
expert in international law, human rights, and CARICOM Law. Justice Winston Anderson (Jamaica), 
who studied law at Cambridge, received a Doctorate in Philosophy from Cambridge in 1988. He majored 
in International and Environmental Law. The same year he was called to the Bar of England and Wales 
as a Barrister of the Honourable Society of Lincoln’s Inn. He also served as Dean of the Faculty of Law 
of the UWI. Most importantly, from 2003 to 2006 he was also appointed as General Counsel of the 
CARICOM Secretariat. 
 123.  See TRANSNATIONAL POWER ELITES: THE NEW PROFESSIONALS OF GOVERNANCE, LAW AND 
SECURITY 1 (Niilo Kauppi & Mikael R. Madsen eds., 2013). 
 124.  Interview n.2. 
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the replacement of the JCPC with a Caribbean Court of Appeal, as also 
revealed by his writings.125 
The influence of de la Bastide in the early days of the Court is 
remarkable. Initially, he played a key role in setting up the newborn Court 
and in the appointment of the other judges to the bench,126 who, in his view, 
had to be first class jurists able to recognize the intricacies of the various 
interests at play in the Caribbean legal fields.127 In particular, de la Bastide’s 
main mission was to make the CCJ the ultimate arbiter of a purely Caribbean 
jurisprudence. In this regard, it is probably not accidental that de la Bastide—
together with Justice Adrian Saunders, who is another member of the old 
English-educated legal elite128—were the two judges chosen to deliver the 
main judgment of the CCJ in Joseph and Boyce. The pro-human rights and 
anti-death penalty outcome of the case clearly represent the view of the two 
judges, who in their previous careers had already distinguished themselves 
as outspoken supporters of the need to make the present CCJ into an 
institution able to make a difference in the protection and enforcement of 
human and fundamental rights in the Caribbean. 
A similarly important role was played by the second President of the 
CCJ, Sir Charles Dennis Byron, who, in addition to his strong Common Law 
background (he graduated from Cambridge, was called to the bar of the Inner 
Temple, pursued private practice with chambers in Saint Kitts & Nevis and, 
 
 125.  See, e.g., Michael de la Bastide, The Case for a Caribbean Court of Appeal, 5 CARIBBEAN L. 
REV. 401, 403 (1995). 
 126.  The judges of the CCJ are appointed by a unique organ, the Regional Judicial and Legal 
Services Commission, of which the President of the CCJ is the Chairman. See Agreement Establishing 
the Caribbean Court of Justice, art. 5, Feb. 14, 2011, available at http://www.caribbeancourt 
ofjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/ccj_agreement.pdf. 
 127.  Other judges were experts in Caribbean Common and National Laws, as in the cases of: Justice 
Rolston Nelson (Trinidad & Tobago), who, after having studied at the University of Oxford and 
University of London, had practiced law in Jamaica and in Trinidad & Tobago, as well at tutored law in 
Jamaica and in Trinidad & Tobago; Justice Adrian Saunders (St. Vincent and the Grenadines), who 
studied at the University of West Indies and at the Hugh Wooding Law School of Trinidad & Tobago, 
before being appointed Chief Justice of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court; Justice Desiree Bernard 
(Guyana), who studied law at the University of London, before being appointed as Chief Justice, and 
Chancellor of the Judiciary of Guyana. Together with Justice de la Bastide, these three judges are part of 
that old elite of Caribbean lawyers that had developed a vision of Caribbean Community Law in terms of 
fundamental rights. In addition to experts in International Law and national Caribbean laws, the bench 
was completed with two judges, whose expertise was on Civil and European Law, as well as Business 
Law, including trusts: Justice Jacob Wit (the Netherlands), who studied law at the Vrije Universiteit of 
Amsterdam, and had held the position as Judge at the Joint Court of Justice of the Netherlands, Antilles 
and Aruba. He was clearly intended to be the civil law (and EU law) judge on the court; Justice David 
Hayton (England), who studied law at the Newcastle University, before ending up as law professor and 
Dean of the Faculty of Law of the King’s College of London, combining academia and practice as a 
world-leading authority on the law of trusts. 
 128.  See id. 
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in 2004, was appointed to the JCPC), also brought to the Court his significant 
experience in Caribbean constitutional law and international human rights, 
himself being former Chief Justice of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court 
and former President of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda.129 Since the beginning of his term, Sir Byron indicated his 
intention to expand the outreach of both jurisdictions of the Court toward 
encompassing human and fundamental rights.130 The most significant 
development in this regard can be found in the Maya and Myrie cases 
discussed above. Through these decisions, the Byron Court not only 
reinforced its role as ultimate arbiter of a Caribbean jurisprudence in the 
Appellate Jurisdiction—hence, following the steps of the de la Bastide 
Court—but also added an additional and more international dimension to its 
practices, in line with the more internationally oriented professional profile 
of its new President: with the Maya case, the CCJ allowed international 
human rights treaties to play a broader role in the Caribbean national legal 
orders; with Myrie, it deliberately transformed the Original Jurisdiction from 
a venue for CARICOM-related and economic disputes into an additional site 
for the protection and enforcement of human and fundamental rights for 
Caribbean citizens. 
In conclusion, once approached from this agent-based perspective, the 
CCJ’s proclivity for getting involved with politically sensitive issues 
becomes less surprising. In fact, this is a consequence of the professional 
expertise of the judges eventually chosen to sit on its bench, who, with two 
exceptions, had almost no expertise on CARICOM Law and were for the 
most part human rights and constitutional law lawyers. 
2. The CACJ as an Extension of the National Judiciaries 
As to the CACJ, of particular importance is the fact that, from its 
inception to the present, the Court was filled with either former Supreme 
Court judges or with public international law attorneys. Only a few of them 
were and are experts of SICA Law.131 The first batch of judges (1994-2005) 
was constituted by an overwhelming majority of former members of national 
Supreme Courts. Illustrative in this regard were the two Nicaraguan judges—
 
 129.  The Right Honourable Sir Charles Michael Dennis Byron, CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/about-the-ccj/judges/byron. 
 130.  Interview n.1. 
 131.  This is hardly surprising as, like the Statute of the Court, the procedure for appointing the judges 
of the CACJ was decided by the Presidents of the Supreme Courts of the Central American States, who 
made sure to be in charge of appointing the judges of the CACJ. 
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Dr. Orlando Trejos Somarriba132 and Dr. Rafael Chamorro Mora133— who 
were not only part of the national judiciaries but were also tightly linked to 
that close network of Supreme Court judges who had established the CACJ 
as a tool for pacifying the Central American region. Concerning the 
remaining members of the first group,134 a special mention must be granted 
to one of the two Honduran judges, Dr. Roberto Ramírez. Dr. Ramírez was 
the person appointed by the Central American Judicial Council to produce a 
preliminary study on the feasibility of the CACJ and, most likely, the one 
who initially suggested to make the present Court into an institutional revival 
of the old Cartago Court as well as an institution chiefly aimed at pacifying 
the Central American region.135 
The tendency of filling the bench of the CACJ with either former 
national judges or with public international law lawyers was confirmed with 
the appointment of the second batch of judges (2005-2015). Here, it is worth 
mentioning Dr. Ricardo Acevedo Peralta, from El Salvador, who, before 
being selected at the CACJ, had been Professor of International Law, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador (1984-1989), member of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration of the United Nations (1988-1995), member 
of the Salvadorian Parliament (1991-1995), member of the Central American 
Parliament (1986-2001), and, finally, agent of El Salvador before the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (2003-2005). Other important figures are: 
Dr. Guillermo Augusto Pérez Cadalso Arias, from Honduras, who had been 
Professor of International Law at the Autonomous Nacional University of 
Honduras, and Judge of the Supreme Court of Honduras; and Dr. Darío 
 
 132.  Dr. Trejos Somarriba was the former President of the Supreme Court of Nicaragua and of the 
Central American Judicial Council. He also played a central role in negotiating the Statute of the Court 
and in its inception.  
 133.  Dr. Chamorro Mora graduated from the Central American University of Managua and had been 
President of the Court of Appeal and former Judge of the Supreme Court of Nicaragua as well as Secretary 
of the Central American Judicial Council. 
 134.  In addition to the two Nicaraguan judges, the bench of the CACJ was composed of the following 
individuals. For El Salvador: Dr. Jorge Antonio Giammattei Avilés, who graduated from the Autonomous 
University of Guadalajara, had been Attorney at Law representing the interests of several international 
and Central American companies, Professor of Law at the Autonomous University of Guadalajara (among 
other things, he taught Customs and Central American Community Law), and judge of the Supreme and 
Constitutional Court of El Salvador; and Dr. Fabio Hércules Pineda, who graduated from the Faculty of 
Law of the University of El Salvador, and had been judge of the Constitutional Law department of the 
Supreme Court of El Salvador. The other judges from Honduras were Dr. Adolfo León Gómez, Professor 
of Mercantile Law, Political Economy and Finances in several Honduran Universities, who had been a 
Member of the Commission for the reformation of the Honduran judiciary, Dr. Roberto Ramirez who 
passed away in 1997 and was substituted by Dr. José Eduardo Gauggel Rivas, who had been Professor 
of Law at the University of San Pedro Sula, and Judge of the Honduran Supreme Court. Judge Gauggel 
Rivas. Dr. Rivas, however, quit his position in 1998. 
 135.  See generally GUTIERREZ G., supra note 112. 
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Francisco Lobo Lara, also from Honduras, who had been Professor of Law 
at the National Autonomous University of Honduras as well as Ambassador 
of Honduras at the United Nations.136 Dr. Lobo Lara repeatedly voiced the 
importance of the CACJ as a tool for pacifying the Central American region 
and for protecting and enforcing the rule of law in the national systems.137 
The influence of jurists with clear expertise in constitutional and/or 
international law on the activity of the CACJ is remarkable, and it has 
inevitably led the Court to be involved with politically sensitive issues. To 
begin with, in many instances, the present CACJ did not hesitate in 
corroborating the thesis of the institutional continuity with the Cartago 
Court. Illustrative in this regard is the reasoning that led the CACJ to impose 
its jurisdiction over Costa Rica in the case Association of Custom Agents of 
Costa Rica v. Costa Rica.138 In this case, the CACJ asserted its power to have 
jurisdiction over Costa Rica by relying on the fact that, over time, the State 
had accepted the jurisdiction of a Central American Court in more than one 
instance: firstly, in 1907 (the Cartago Court), secondly in 1962 (the ODECA 
Court), and finally, in 1991 by ratifying the Protocol of Tegucigalpa. This 
reasoning, in turn, confirms that the present judges of the CACJ perceive 
their Court not only as an institution aimed at building a common economic 
space among the Central American States, but also as the continuation of a 
long project of regional pacification through judicial means, initiated by the 
Cartago Court and resurrected by the present CACJ. 
The peculiar expertise and interests of the CACJ’s judges also 
influenced Court’s activity in other cases. Perhaps the most important in this 
regard are the Bolaños case and the three cases connected to the territorial 
disputes between Honduras, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. In all of these 
instances, the CACJ not only showed its inclination to deal with issues of 
constitutional and international nature, but also showed that these topics best 
fit the interests and the capacities of its judges. As shown elsewhere, the 
CACJ has also produced several rulings dealing with the less politically 
salient issues of implementation and enforcement of SICA Law.139 Yet, these 
 
 136.  The remaining judges were: for Nicaragua, Dr. Silvia Isabel Rosales Bolaños, a lawyer 
specialized in Criminal Law and Procedure, who had been Judge of the Criminal Law section of the 
Nicaraguan Supreme Court and an activist known for her role in the protection of women and children’s 
rights; and Dr. Carlos Antonio Guerra Gallardo, who had been Member of the Human Rights 
Commission, Member of the Nicaraguan Parliament and Judge of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court. El 
Salvador appointed Dr. Julio Enrique Acosta Baires, a lawyer specialized in Mercantile Law, who had 
been Dean of the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences at the Alberto Masferrer University of El Salvador 
and Judge of the Supreme Court of El Salvador. 
 137.  FRANCISCO DARIO LOBO LARA, CONFLICTOS ENTRE PODERES DEL ESTADO 155 (2012). 
 138.  Case no. 87–06–08, 54 (CACJ 2008).   
 139.  Caserta, supra note 3, at 592–600. 
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judgments hardly had concrete impact on the ground and have been even 
criticized from many quarters for being out of touch both with the reality of 
the Central American process of regional integration and with the difficult 
political situation in which several states of the region navigate.140 
Conversely, judgments like the Bolaños case—though criticized for 
politicizing the Court too much—or like those between Honduras, Costa 
Rica and Nicaragua, are generally recognized as the most important 
contributions of the Court both to the development of Central American 
Community Law and to the pacification of the Central American region. 
C. The Jurisprudence of the Two Courts as a Legitimization Strategy 
From the analysis conducted above, the involvement of the two Courts 
in politically sensitive issues reflects both the general structuring dynamics 
of the Central American and Caribbean legal fields as well as the 
professional profiles of the judges of the two Courts. Therefore, I argue that 
these politically sensitive rulings of both the CACJ and the CCJ constitute 
part of a legitimization strategy of the judges, who have attempted to make 
their Courts reflective of the various struggles at play in the Central 
American and Caribbean legal fields. 
As to the CCJ, the judges tried to make the Court’s practices palatable 
to the different constellations of legal elites at play in such field; most 
notably, to those lawyers advocating for severing the ties with the JCPC and 
to those who feared that by abandoning the English judicial system, the 
human and fundamental rights standards in the region would be curtailed. 
This legitimation strategy is evident in many of the cases decided by the 
Court. With Joseph and Boyce, the CCJ dismissed the charges of being a 
“hanging court”—thus silencing the critiques of some pro-JCPC lawyers—
and showed that it was much more than a local epigone of the English Court. 
This, in turn, demonstrated to the whole Caribbean legal environment that 
the CCJ is able and willing to become the ultimate arbiter of an indigenous 
jurisprudence. The decisions of the Court in Myrie and Tomlinson can also 
be read along these lines, as through them the CCJ signaled to the main 
stakeholders of the CARICOM that its OJ is not only a venue for large pan-
Caribbean businesses, but also a site for individuals to seek protection of the 
rights granted to them by the RTC. 
As to the CACJ, the judges aimed at triggering the interest of those 
lawyers and politicians who envisioned Central American Community Law 
as a tool to pacify and democratize the region. This legitimization strategy is 
evident in many of the cases decided by the Court. The two cases between 
 
 140.  Interviews n.4, n.9. 
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Nicaragua and Honduras and the one between Nicaragua and Costa Rica are 
clear attempts by the judges to place the CACJ at the top of the Central 
American legal systems and to make it into the sole and ultimate arbiter for 
inter-state disputes in the region. The same rationale lies behind the Bolaños 
case, by means of which the Court has attempted to impose its authority as 
the ultimate enforcer of the rule of law within the legal system of each of its 
Member States. 
To conclude, I wish to return to the underlying theoretical discussion of 
this paper. In particular, the experiences of the CACJ and the CCJ show that 
the idea advanced by many authors, according to which recently established 
ICs  must not be involved with politically sensitive disputes to avoid political 
pushbacks,141 may not always be the right strategy for ICs entrenched in 
socio-political contexts where national understandings of legality and the 
overall ideological and professional preferences of powerful legal elites are 
not strongly linked to regional integration and economic law. In Weberian 
terms,142 in their practices, the CACJ and the CCJ did not develop some kind 
of formal and neutral legal rationality àl’européenne, but instead aimed at 
producing substantively thick regional legal systems with the goal of 
overcoming the structural limitation of the national ones and, eventually, of 
legitimizing the two regions in the eyes of the major stakeholders of their 
systems. 
Finally, both the CACJ and the CCJ have become involved with 
politically sensitive issues because, at their roots, they are not—or at least 
not only—EU-style ICs, but the international manifestation of national and 
regional processes of social and legal reproduction encompassing the various 
forms of legality that have characterized the Central American and 
Caribbean social fields over time. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
On the side of developing technical and apolitical bodies of Community 
Law, both the CACJ and the CCJ have come to rule over politically sensitive 
issues, ranging from freedom of movement to issues of mega-politics. In 
doing so, both Courts have expanded the reach of their competencies, 
emphasizing the respect of fundamental rights, democracy, rule of law, and 
good governance. This paper has sought to explain the behavior of these two 
Courts and the reasons why they have avoided significant pushbacks by their 
Member States. It has done so by analyzing the trans-historical trajectories 
of the main structuring forces of the Central American and Caribbean social 
 
 141.  Alter, supra note 12; Madsen, supra note 12.  
 142.  See generally KIERAN ALLEN, MAX WEBER: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (2004). 
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and legal fields and the professional paths of the judges eventually chosen to 
sit on the benches of the two Courts. Through such analysis, the article shows 
that both the CACJ and the CCJ were only partially established to pursue 
regional economic integration and that the interests of the agents that 
participated in their creation as well as of their judges revolved mostly 
around pacification and democratization in Central America and 
decolonization through the development of a system of human and 
fundamental rights in the Caribbean. In turn, these interests have 
significantly impacted the two Courts’ institutional outlook and practices, 
making them willing to engage into politically sensitive issues rather than 
act as mere regional economic courts. 
These findings have important theoretical consequences. Most notably, 
ICs cannot be explained solely by looking at the moment in which they were 
established (as, for the most part, delegation theories do) and that they cannot 
be constrained in  fixed and static definitions provided a priori (i.e. Old-
Style or New-Style, economic or human rights ICs) but that each singular IC 
is the consequence of highly differentiated socio-political and historical 
contexts which respond not only to general global forces but also—if not 
above all—to national and regional conditions and interests. ICs are, hence, 
not unitary, homogenous, and discrete units influenced by rational behavior 
and institutional design, but are instead social facts to be investigated as a 
product of the societies in which they are embedded, as they are the result of 
broad structural developments, collective (most times adversarial) human 
action, professional and group interests, socialization, and identity 
formation.143 In other words, ICs are both deeply rooted in national legal 




 143.  Similar to what is claimed in FREDRIK  SÖDERBAUM, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
REGIONALISM: THE CASE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA 31 (2004). 
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